This past spring, the recently deceased Hafez al-Assad, Syria’s leader since late 1970, again dashed hopes for a pacified Middle East that could direct its energies to social and economic issues. What was the source of Assad’s continuing rejectionism? Didn’t he want peace, and more important, why was he so hard-nosed about regaining 100 percent of what he claims is rightfully Syrian (every inch of the Golan) when he could easily have had 99 percent or otherwise face the possibility of getting nothing?

While Assad was a complex man, the reasons for his behavior are far from mystical. Did he want peace? Probably. Did he want the return of the Golan Heights? Certainly. Then what was the hold-up? The problem was that, in addition to these, Assad, in poor health for years, had other important desires. He was concerned about his own succession, hoping that his son, Bashar, would take the helm at his demise. He was also concerned about maintaining Alawite control. The Alawis are about 10 percent of Syria’s population, yet they dominate economically and politically, much to the chagrin of the masses. Assad also wanted Syria to remain in Lebanon, where it reaps enormous economic benefits, has ultimate political control, and feeds terrorist actions it finds useful toward its own ends. And Assad also enjoyed a rewarding leadership role in the Arab world. So he wanted many things, but they were not all compatible.

The first issue is Syria’s importance, and with that, Assad’s importance. Syria, one of the few countries in the world without a stock exchange, has been an economic basket case for a prolonged period. Twenty years ago, for example, per capita GDP in Egypt, hardly a financial "tiger," was only 35 percent of Syria’s. Today it is higher! And Syria’s very closed society offers little to the rest of the world either as a supplier or as a market. Syria would command little or no attention but for the fact that it is the key stumbling block to an overall Middle East settlement. This rejectionist role is what gave Assad global and regional significance. He "stood up" our secretary of state in Damascus, snubbed and torpedoed US peace initiatives, and, just last March at a meeting in Switzerland, frustrated President Clinton’s personal attempts to broker a Golan deal. The world’s attention frequently focused on him, but only because Syria was rejectionist. If Assad had agreed to a settlement, he would have forfeited his prime source of importance. Syria would then have become just another struggling, dictatorship. And domestically, Assad would have lost a source of personal legitimacy, since the ability to gain world attention helped validate his corrupt, autocratic, and economically disastrous regime.

Assad had long been ailing, and he had groomed his older son, Basil, to take the reins. However, these plans were spoiled when Basil died in an auto mishap. Accordingly, Assad had to refocus his energies on securing succession for Bashar. This was no mean chore, because, unlike his brother, Bashar did not have strong political motivations. Secondly, Rif’at, Assad’s exiled brother, does have such aspirations as well as considerable political and underground connections. Accordingly, Assad’s fullest attention had been devoted to this issue; all else was secondary. And while reattaining the Golan –even a mere 99 percent – would have greatly enhanced Assad’s personal prestige, it would have done little to ensure Bashar’s succession. Assad’s agenda was clearly a "first things first" one.

Further, since 1976, Syria has occupied Lebanon, which Syrians believe is an integral part of greater Syria. Importantly, over a million Syrians now work in Lebanon, where wages are roughly double those at home. And Syria garners other financial gains, including a thriving heroin business, from its occupation. Any agreement with Israel was likely to require a reduced – or zero – presence in Lebanon. Syria also justifies this presence as that of "protector" of a fellow Arab state from Israeli aggression. If there is peace with Israel, this justification goes away, as might Syria’s lucrative economic presence.

Additionally, most of the Islamic world deems Assad’s Alawite sect heretical, and thus unfit for leadership. Only by virtue of a Shi’ite cleric’s fatwa (religious decree) have the Alawites gained some measure of legitimacy. A fatwa, however, can be revoked, and well might be if Syria concludes peace with Israel. Assad – or his successor – thus risks a jihad (holy war) against an Alawite regime. Further, joining the peace parade would also mandate that Syria cease harboring and channeling terrorists. Clearly, peace entailed some very serious costs for Assad’s Syria.

And peace itself would have threatened Assad’s domestic socio-economic status quo, for a pacified Middle East could turn its attentions to economic development. Public expectations in Syria for progress and greater openness would heighten. Yet those very expectations, coupled with the changes that economic development would bring, threaten Alawite and Assad family domination of Syrian society.

Hafez al-Assad was a wily and crafty man. Did he want the Golan? Surely, but only at his price. And his demands were far more significant than just one percent more in territory, for the disputed land rims the Sea of Galilee, giving Syria water access and some measure of control. It is possible that after years of a warm peace, Israel might, in a neighborly gesture, cede this area – whose legal status is somewhat cloudy – to Syria, but Assad knew that this would not happen immediately. So his purposefully unacceptable price allowed him to keep Lebanon and concentrate his efforts on ensuring Bashar as successor. It also gave him legitimacy at home – the fearless leader who did not back down to Zionist or American demands. He gained kudos from Arab hardliners everywhere, and to the Arab masses he appeared resolute and forceful. Further, his past experiences gave him assurance that any time he either wished attention or wanted to deflect domestic focus from his regime’s repression or economic failures, he could once again put out peace feelers, and American and Israeli envoys would quickly come running.

But Assad is now gone, so what is the future likely to bring? The answer for the short-term is somewhat unclear, although peace with Israel and a Golan deal are clearly not in the picture. A succession crisis is well underway, with Bashar concentrating his energies on consolidating his power and securing his position. His main source of threats would be from the military and from his uncle, Rif’at, and his supporters. It would not be surprising if the current anti-corruption campaign included some assassinations of politically troublesome individuals. A chapter in Tom Friedman’s book, From Beirut to Jerusalem, is aptly titled "Hama Rules" and details the ruthless and massive brutality – in the form of destroying a town (Hama) and killing ten to fifteen thousand residents – which Assad was willing to employ when challenged. Bashar is likely to see his determination tested, and it is as yet unclear whether or not he, too, is willing to play by Hama rules.

So a succession crisis and a period of power consolidation prevails and could last for a couple of years. During this period there will be no bold foreign policy initiatives. In the longer term, however, there is somewhat more hope, although most of the costs of peace to Syria just enumerated will continue. Nonetheless, the long-term pressures of economic deterioration will make peace more pressing, and peace-inspired foreign aid inflows will make it more appealing. Bashar, if he prevails, is far more Westernized than his father and likely to be more receptive to an open economy and international acceptance. Further, rejectionism will not bring him the same regional or international importance which it gave his father. While he does inherit his father’s mantra concerning the Golan, once he is able to consolidate power, his prime source of international legitimacy will come not from rejectionism – for few outside leaders will flow to him as they did to his father – but from peace – and prosperity-making. But this can only occur when Syria’s ruler, whoever that might be, is totally secure. So the longer-term prospects are less bleak, and could even be labeled "brighter" if, by the time of power consolidation, the Israelis and Palestinians have successfully concluded a modus vivendi.