"What Went Wrong With Oslo?"

A large peace camp, whose members were prepared to see Israel make far-reaching concessions for peace, that supported Ehud Barak, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Yossi Beilin, and Yossi Sarid on the road to Camp David and Taba, was willing to make major compromises and ended up banging its head against the Palestinian brick wall. As a result of this collision, the peace camp has broken into three factions. The first faction, small but vocal, continues indiscriminately to back every Palestinian whim. The second and main faction, still loyal to its commitment to peace based on compromise, understands that Arafat is still a warmonger and thus wisely sent the representatives of the Labor party to the national unity government.

Between these two factions is a third group that is in crisis: its members are the architects of the Oslo accords. [They currently believe that] the agreement signed in Oslo in 1993 placed the Middle East on the much longed-for peace track. However, they refuse to admit that it became an anachronism the moment Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat decided that he would not end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite the magnanimity of the Barak government. Instead, the "Oslo architects" insist on downplaying the gravity of the Palestinian leadership’s almost exclusive responsibility for the shift from negotiations to violence.

The prevalent spirit among members of this group is present in a significant working paper prepared by one of the "Oslo architects," Dr. Ron Pundak. In the document, Pundak asks, "What went wrong?" on the road from Oslo to Taba. This question, however, should really be directed at Pundak and at his colleagues.

In order to free Arafat from responsibility for the present crisis, Pundak comes out with the incredible assertion that, in September 2000, the Palestinians were "in a political-psychological state of utter despair." But why at precisely that point in time? When Benjamin Netanyahu was prime minister, he offered them nothing and, in Pundak’s own words, "physically abused the peace process." Yet, during Netanyahu’s regime, the intifada hibernated. Why did the Palestinians return to the tactics of blood and fire after Barak and the members of his cabinet had agreed to accept Clinton’s proposal, which would have given the Palestinians 96 percent of the West Bank and another one percent after territorial exchanges? The Palestinians’ reaction is particularly mystifying in view of Barak’s historic breakthrough on Jerusalem (even Pundak admits the significance of that breakthrough).

Even if the Palestinians were not getting absolutely everything they were demanding, the position Barak adopted was so close to their own goals that, if they really wanted a peace treaty, then logically they should have continued negotiating with the Israelis, instead of shooting at them.

In his working paper, Pundak detects a flaw in the fact that Barak had served 35 years in the Israel Defense Forces. This [believes Pundak] created a mental-psychological [block among the Palestinians]. But Pundak failed to discern the importance of the fact that Arafat, the person he was supposed to be negotiating with, always appears in public in uniform. Another flaw Pundak points to is the fact that Clinton labeled Arafat an opponent of peace. Clinton should have refrained from such political stereotyping, claims Pundak: he "should have been less emotional and more ‘presidential.’" But what is so terrible about Israel enjoying the dividends of its peace policies when faced with such an adamant opponent of peace on the other side?

There is one conclusion that the "Oslo architects" have failed to reach, although it is so transparent and so crucial: Arafat simply refuses to say good-bye to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Yet they are not asking him the pointed, but essentially naïve, question: "Why?" Arafat felt less threatened by Netanyahu – who had serious doubts about the prospects of ever seeing an end to the dispute – than by Barak, who actually was striving for the attainment of the very goals the Palestinian leader cherishes. That is the real reason why Arafat decided to use violent tactics against Barak and not against Netanyahu.

Instead of admitting that Arafat stubbornly wants to perpetuate the conflict, the "Oslo architects" note what they claim is the problematic conduct of the peace negotiations during the Barak era and argue that this factor was one of the "prime limitations" that obstructed the road to peace. This argument, which is not particularly convincing, insults the intelligence of Arafat and his followers, who, according to the architects, passed up an opportunity for peace because they did not like the way Barak behaved during the talks.

The matter is not just of historical significance. Even today, when Beilin and Pundak are conducting a commendable dialogue with the Palestinians, the following demand must be met: once and for all, Arafat must finally take the initiative and present a binding proposal that specifies the price the Palestinians are prepared to pay for an end to the dispute with Israel. That proposal must take into consideration Israel’s two essential requirements: one, Israel’s character as a Jewish state must be maintained in accordance with the Wilsonian principle of respect for every nation’s right to self-determination; and two, Israel’s security needs must be given priority. If that demand is presented to Arafat, it will immediately be clear that, although the settlements are a serious drag on Israel’s ability to deal with the items on its diplomatic and national agendas, the Jewish communities on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are not the reason why peace is yet to be attained.

The settlements cannot be the reason because, at Camp David and Taba, for the first time since the Six-Day War, Israel actually expressed a willingness to consider giving up all the West Bank – and the Palestinian response was expressed in blood and fire.•