“Seven-fold Betrayal”: The Murder of Soviet Yiddish
Joseph Sherman
Seven lights irradiate his head
To set against his seven-fold betrayal—
He is become again anointed poet
On the dead floor of the prison cell.
—H. Leivick, “Der man fun lid (Moyshe Kulbakn)”
[The Prisoner Poet]1
Jewish tradition mandates the lighting of memorial candles on the anniversary of
bereavements, to re-member those departed. This year, the Jewish literary world
commemorates Stalin’s post-war destruction of Yiddish literature and culture.
Fifty years ago, on August 12, 1952, thirteen prominent Soviet Jews were shot in
the basement of Moscow’s Lubyanka prison.2 One third of them were distinguished
men of Yiddish letters: the poets Itsik Fefer, Dovid Hofshteyn, Leyb Kvitko, and
Peretz Markish, and the novelist Dovid Bergelson. The victims of these judicial
murders were all accused of “bourgeois nationalism,” the crime of claiming for
the Jewish people the right to be regarded as a nationality with a distinctive
cultural identity. They were virtually the last among dozens of important
20th-century Jewish literati eliminated by the Soviet state from the early 1930s
onwards: among the most prominent eliminated by the Soviet state were Moyshe
Litvakov, Max Erik, Izi Kharik, and Moyshe Kulbak in 1937, Yisroel Tsinberg in
1938, and Zelig Akselrod in 1941.
At first, Stalin’s “purges” of those who opposed him, through the use of
fabricated show trials and arbitrary death sentences, were directly antisemitic
neither in origin nor in intention. They swept away many Jews because these had
risen to high rank in the Communist Party, and Stalin therefore perceived them,
in company with thousands of their Russian countrymen, as potential threats to
the absolute nature of his despotism. Some supported Trotsky and were therefore
inevitably doomed after Trotsky’s expulsion from the USSR in 1928. Others,
however, faithfully served the Revolution with high idealistic conviction. They
certainly did not anticipate being vilified and shot as spies, traitors, and
counter-revolutionaries. But here lay the bitter irony of so much commitment to
Bolshevism, particularly on the part of Jews in general and Yiddish writers in
particular, for whom the Soviet Union, in the first decade of its existence,
appeared as the savior of their language and its culture.
This near-messianic hope seemed well founded. After the October Revolution of
1917, the Bolsheviks enunciated a new nationality policy, based on their
professed commitment to universal human brotherhood, that would ostensibly
enable the Jews of Eastern Europe to live at last as equals in the land their
forbears had settled for generations. Five members of Lenin’s first Politburo
were Jews, and during the first decade of the emerging Soviet Union’s existence,
Jews were in the forefront of all Party activities. Funded and encouraged by the
new Soviet state, Yiddish cultural activ-ity appeared on the verge of a fresh
new blooming. Re-search institutes, literary organizations, newspapers,
publishing houses, theaters, and schools were established in great cities with
large Jewish populations like Kiev, Minsk, Kharkov, and Moscow, inspiring
Yiddish writers throughout Eastern Europe to set their work afloat in the
mainstream of a world culture that seemed to flow from the great haven of the
USSR. To clarify the Jews’ anomalous position vis-à-vis other “national
minorities,” in 1928 Stalin, at that time People’s Commissar for Nationalities,
declared Birobidzhan, an area in southeastern Siberia, a Jewish territorial
district that, with Yiddish as its official language, was upgraded to an
autonomous Jewish region (oblast) in 1934. Yiddish writers in the Soviet Union
sang the praises of the new world opening up before them, urging
Yiddish-speaking Jews worldwide to throw off the yoke of capitalism and join the
revolutionary struggle in the new motherland.
By 1930, however, when Stalin was in the final stages of entrenching his
dictatorship, some Yiddish writers started to feel oppressed by the insidious
menace steadily encircling their lives and work. Izi Kharik was among the first
to articulate what was then still a nameless dread:
Flee? I cannot, I do not want to flee,
And now it has become impossible to stay here anymore.
Destruction has blanketed the courtyards,
The windowpanes show only shrouded streaks of light.
Nothing and emptiness, wasteness and winds,
A gloomy silent hour hovers here ...
I walk on and my fancy plays me false—
Someone still comes on from behind:
I turn around to look and no one’s there,
I slowly go my way and yet I want to run ...
My footsteps clatter terror-stricken on the ground,
I drag my body onward and beg that day will dawn,
That day will dawn, that day will dawn—
I cannot go on anymore!3
Why had the atmosphere changed so radically in so short a time? Who could
believe that it had changed, when all the major state-supported structures of
Yiddish cultural life were still in place? As was steadily to appear, the danger
lay in these very cultural structures themselves. In 1919, barely two years
after the Revolution, when a special “Jewish Section” of the Communist Party was
created to address matters of direct Jewish concern, the Moscow State Yiddish
Theater (Russian acronym GOSET), was founded in the capital to bring to the
Jewish masses, in their own Yiddish vernacular, the teachings of
Marxism-Leninism in plays especially scripted to emphasize the stultifying
domination of traditional Judaism by comparison with the exhilarating freedom of
the Revolution. Some of the seeds of Stalin’s emerging anti-Jewish persecution
were sown by this theater’s work, and by the opportunities for encoded
self-expression it offered some of those most closely associated with it. Since
it increasingly became more and more criminal to express any sense of Jewish
pride and particularity, the productions mounted by GOSET kept moving in and out
of danger.
The founder-director of GOSET, Alexander Granovsky, had worked intensively with
the troupe for nearly ten years, bringing it to a high standard of artistic
expertise before he defected to the West during the theater’s first European
tour in 1928. Direction of the theater then passed to the company’s leading
actor, Solomon Mikhoels (Solomon Mikhailovich Vovsi). Though Mikhoels was
committed to the ideals of the Revolution, he remained equally committed to his
Jewish heritage and never became an official member of the Communist Party. He
valued his people as an identifiable national group with a proud culture, and
his work consistently endeavored to marry socialist ideology to Jewish national
traditions. When increasing pressure was brought to bear on him to make his
theater’s repertoire conform more closely to the Party line, he responded by
attempting to depict contemporary events and doctrines from the perspective of
Jewish history, and he further enhanced the Jewishness of his productions by
drawing extensively on Jewish folklore and music. Mikhoels was wholly convinced
that unless his Yiddish theater develop-ed materials drawn from specifically
Jewish sources, it would render itself superfluous, so he solicited and produced
plays from some of the most gifted Yiddish writers of his day: Dovid Bergelson,
Moyshe Kulbak, Peretz Markish, and Shmuel Halkin all saw their distinctively
Jewish dramas received with acclaim on his stage. As a result, almost all of
them were also doomed, to some extent as a result of the “nationalistic” themes
this work developed.
Initially, the goals of GOSET under Mikhoels did not conflict with the policies
of either the Communist Party or the Soviet State. However, the Party line on
what was acceptable in public discourse and what was not hardened significantly
between 1928 and 1934. With the introduction of his first Five-Year Plan, Stalin
ruthlessly enforced the collectivization of farms and the intensification of
industry, in part by eradicating all who in any way opposed his policies. Thus
began the Great Purges, which systematically destroyed all so-called “wreckers,”
“saboteurs,” and “rightwing deviationists.” At the same time, as a counterweight
against mounting German aggression abroad, Stalin reintroduced at home the same
brand of Russian chauvinism on which the tsarist empire had depended for so
long. Earlier Bolshevik catchphrases like “world revolution” and “proletarian
internationalism” were subtly replaced by Stalin’s “theory of the elder
brother,” written into the Soviet constitution in 1936. This doctrine severely
truncated the hitherto guaranteed liberties of the Soviet republics, and wholly
eliminated those of formerly respected national minorities. Inevitably, Soviet
Jews, without any recognized historical claim to their own territory, felt this
repression most immediately. Another assault on them came in March 1938, when a
Politburo resolution introduced compulsory study of the Russian language “in the
schools of the national republics and regions.” National minorities, again
including the Jews, suffered the steady but total closure of their cultural and
educational organs. Lenin’s early dictum that complete assimilation was a
precondition for the acceptance and survival of the Jews in Russia was now also
repeatedly invoked, so that far from pursuing that national-cultural
self-identity the Revolution had promised them, Jews came to feel that their
inviolable Soviet duty was to acquire Russian culture and language as quickly as
possible.
The state’s demand for complete Russification and assimilation thrust Yiddish
cultural workers into a dangerously untenable position. They were devoting all
their creative energy to a cause that official Party ideology now insisted was
“nationalistic.” Those they were supposedly addressing were dying away:
children, no longer taught in Yiddish, regarded Russian as their mother tongue;
great numbers of GOSET’s Moscow audiences no longer spoke Yiddish. External
pressures also forced Jews further out of Soviet public life. The Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact of 1939 led to a purge of Jews in the Foreign Ministry. The Russian
Vyacheslav Molotov replaced the Jew Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Minister; other,
less fortunate diplomats of Jewish nationality were removed from their posts and
imprisoned. Right up until the German invasion and the outbreak of war,
discrimination against Jews, and the state’s closure of those cultural and
educational institutions it had formerly supported, cut off the legs of the
Yiddish revival in the USSR.
After Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, this creeping official
antisemitism was halted. With the USSR initially on the losing end of the
invasion and in sore need of Allied aid, Stalin could not openly pursue an
anti-Jewish policy of discrimination and suppression. Publicly, at least, all
anti-Jewish measures were subordinated to fight what the Soviets came to call
“The Great Patriotic War.” A Jewish mass rally, officially sanctioned and held
on August 24, 1941, included passionate addresses from eminent Jewish public
figures including Mikhoels, Markish, Bergelson, and the internationally
celebrated journalist Ilya Ehrenburg, all of whom stressed that Hitler’s
international war of conquest was specifically aimed also at the destruction of
the Jewish people. The crisis precipitated by the war made possible this kind of
claim, in the teeth of twenty years of rigorous Soviet prohibition of any
assertion of Jewish unity or particularity. From beginning to end of the war,
Jewish leaders openly called special attention to the extent of Jewish suffering
in Europe, and appealed for a worldwide alliance of “brother Jews” against the
Nazi evil. Sentiments like these, vital at this period for the unification of
the Soviet war effort, would malevolently be used ten years later to fabricate
an indictment carrying the death penalty against those who had earlier been
encouraged to express them.
As a sop to the Allies, and a mask over Soviet reality, Stalin now sent Litvinov
to Washington as Soviet ambassador. He also authorized the formation of five
separate anti-Fascist committees representing special interest groups—Jews,
women, youth, scientists, and Slavs—to solicit material and financial aid from
the West by establishing overseas contacts and assiduously disseminating
pro-Soviet propaganda. On December 15, 1941, Stalin appointed Mikhoels chairman
of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC), and the veteran Bolshevik activist
Shakhno Epshteyn as its deputy chairman and executive secretary. By May 1942,
the most respected Jews in Soviet public life had been made members of the JAFC;
its executive committee included Hofshteyn, Markish, Kvitko, Fefer, and
Bergelson, the poet and dramatist Shmuel Halkin, the biochemist Lina Shtern, and
the physician Boris Shimeliovich. Established at the same time was the Yiddish
daily newspaper Eynikeyt (Unity), the first issue of which appeared on 17 July
1942. All the anti-Fascist committees operated under the direction of Solomon
Losovsky, a Jew who was simultaneously deputy chairman of the newly created
Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo) and Deputy People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs.
The JAFC, of course, always functioned under tight state control. Fearful of any
upsurge of Jewish nationalism within the USSR, even while the German invasion
was at its height, Stalin secretly put into action an antisemitic program of
“national-personnel” control, with the deliberate aim of placing only Russians
in the key positions of public administration. A report entitled “The Selection
and Promotion of Personnel in the Arts” that was submitted to the Politburo in
August 1942 identified by name, and in terms of percentages, all Jews employed
in State cultural institutions, and recommended that they be replaced. A brisk
campaign for “the purity of Russian art,” never publicly admitted, was then
speedily implemented. At the same time, in an attempt to encourage more foreign
aid to the USSR, Stalin agreed to permit a delegation from the JAFC to accept a
joint invitation, issued by several pro-Soviet American war relief committees,
to visit the USA and Britain. Mikhoels and Fefer were authorized to go. Sholem
Aleichem’s son-in-law, the ardently pro-Communist, Russian-born American
journalist, Ben-Zion Goldberg, organized the tour. Although the invitation had
come from committees of private individuals and was neither issued nor
negotiated through the US State Department, all engagements during the trip were
strictly regulated by the Soviet embassy in Washington.
In mid-June 1943, Mikhoels and Fefer arrived in the US and began a hectic round
of banquets, receptions, rallies, and meetings with American and international
Jewish political, cultural, and charitable organizations. Among the many
distinguished persons they met, including Albert Einstein, Charles Chaplin, and
Yehudi Menu-hin, the most critical in the light of future events were Chaim
Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organi-zation (WZO); Nahum Goldmann,
director of the World Jewish Congress (WJC); and James Rosenberg, one of the
leaders of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Com-mittee (JDC). Foreign
Minister Molotov cleared all these meetings in advance, and all of them took
place in the presence of a Soviet diplomat and a Soviet interpreter.
At their first meeting in New York, Rosenberg touched on the future of the
Crimea and the possibility of creating an autonomous Jewish settlement there, in
which surviving Jews, dispossessed and displaced by the Nazi invasion, might
rebuild their lives. The JDC undertook to become a part-sponsor of such a
project should it materialize. After their return to the USSR in early November
1943, Mikhoels and Fefer naturally gave their superior, Losovsky, a full report
on their tour, including a detailed account of Rosenberg’s offers. Losovsky then
arranged a meeting between JAFC leaders and Molotov to discuss this putative
Crimean project, and since at this meeting’s conclusion they received only a
vague response—“Write a letter and we’ll look into it”—the JAFC decided to
submit a memorandum on this subject to Stalin personally. This “Crimean brief”
was a disastrous mistake. It suggested to the morbidly mistrustful Stalin that
the JAFC was now seeking offi-cially to represent Soviet Jews, and thus to
acquire some kind of political influence, and he viewed this approach as
threatening, particularly as he had intensified his distrust of his former
Allies after Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5,
1946.
The general situation of Soviet Jews unquestionably worsened after the war. In
the Ukraine and other regions, violent pogroms erupted in 1945. Leyb Kvitko,
sent to report on the circumstances of Jews in the Crimea, for example,
discovered that, despite all their suffering at Nazi hands, their repatriation
was now being blocked by Soviet authorities, who denied them residence rights,
work permits, and financial help. American and Western aid was either being
stolen or diverted. These injustices were reported, and a token state commission
was established, which, not surprisingly, dismissed all the accusations. This
manifest upsurge of Soviet antisemitism was the consequence of the anti-Jewish
policy instituted by the Kremlin long before the war began. Nazi propaganda
circulated in the areas occupied by the invading Germans simply exacerbated a
longstanding prejudice.
Sensing that his best interests would be served by taking temporary account of
Western sympathy for collective Jewish suffering, Stalin did not immediately
stamp out the budding national movement among Soviet Jews. Nevertheless he did
everything in his power to minimize the Holocaust, insisting that all Soviet
citizens had suffered equally from Hitler’s savagery, and re-emphasizing that
the Marxist-Leninist dogma of “proletarian internationalism” and “proletarian
solidarity” ruled out all possibility of national particularism. Dogmatic
propaganda, under the slogan “Communist internationalism and Soviet patriotism,”
was stepped up, and the MGB (later NKVD and then KGB), the all-intrusive state
security service, was ordered to probe the activities of the JAFC and its
affiliated institutions. Soviet Jews were swiftly isolated from the outside
world, while at home, efforts to assimilate them were intensified, Jewish
cultural and educational activities were shut down, and Jews continued to be
discriminated against in the workplace.
With typical duplicity, for propaganda and espionage reasons of its own, the
Soviet government at the same time permitted visits to the USSR from two
pro-Soviet American Jews, the journalist Ben-Zion Goldberg, and Peysekh Novick,
the editor of New York’s pro-Communist Yiddish daily Morgn-frayheyt. Goldberg
arrived in Moscow at the end of 1945, and though he met Kalinin, the USSR’s
nominal head of state, and was allowed to travel widely in the Ukraine,
Byelorussia, Latvia, and Lithuania, he was refused permission to visit the
vaunted Jewish autonomous region of Birobidzhan. Soviet intelligence kept close
watch over Goldberg’s visit, making extensive notes of all those in the JAFC
with whom he met. Novick visited the USSR from September 1946 through January
1947, and he too was closely monitored, being regarded, for the purposes Stalin
had designed for him, as an “American spy,” despite the fact that he had been a
committed member of the American Communist Party since 1921 and was, like
Goldberg, ironically enough regarded by the FBI as a “Moscow agent.”
Hoping to undermine British influence in the Middle East, Stalin supported the
establishment of the State of Israel. In 1947, on May 14th and again on November
26th, Andrei Gromyko, USSR ambassador to the UN, was instructed to endorse the
partition of Palestine. To serve this end further, on April 20, 1948, in a
statement that radically departed from the official Party line on the Holocaust
in order to soothe Western sensibilities, Gromyko explicitly declared: “The
heavy sacrifices of the Jewish people during the tyranny of Hitlerites in Europe
emphasize the necessity and justify the demands of the Jews to create their own
independent state in Palestine.” To serve its own interests, the USSR
consequently became one of the first world powers to recognize the new State of
Israel, and since Stalin hoped that Israel’s new government might lean
politically toward Moscow, in 1948 he received Golda Meyerson (later Meir) as
Israel’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union.
Even so, Stalin remained profoundly suspicious of Soviet Jews and their
attraction to the West, and he made up his mind to intimidate them. As a
preliminary step in this direction, he cunningly arranged for the murder of
Mikhoels, the charismatic and outspoken chairman of the JAFC, whom hundreds of
Soviet Jews regarded as their intercessor and protector, and to whom many
appealed personally for help in their difficulties with the state. Since
Mikhoels was a bold and flamboyant personality of widespread celebrity—the
actor-director had dared publicly to express grief for the Jewish millions
murdered in the Holocaust, and could barely conceal his interest in the
political foundation of a Jewish homeland—Stalin evidently felt that murdering
him clandestinely would suit his long-term plans for Soviet Jewry better than an
arrest and a staged trial during which Mikhoels might very well fail in court to
play the role assigned to him in a script prepared by the MGB.
In January 1948, Mikhoels was sent as a Stalin Prize judge to evaluate a new
Yiddish theater production opening in Minsk. There, on the night of January 12,
1948, MGB agents murdered him together with the MGB agent who had accompanied
him, carefully arranging the corpses to look like the casualties of a
hit-and-run motorist; it was as victims of a motor accident that their deaths
were presented to the public. The autopsy report confirmed what the authorities
required, while in Moscow, Mikhoels was given a lavish state funeral and many
posthumous honors: GOSET was renamed after him, several performances were given
in his memory, and the Moscow city council discussed renaming after him the
street on which his theater stood. All this was a typical Stalinist ploy
designed to allay suspicion about the abruptness of Mikhoels’s death, and to
conceal from immediate public perception the anti-Jewish persecution that had
long been planned and would soon be put into operation.
In the spring of 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel excited many
Soviet Jews, especially as Stalin backed diplomatic recognition with military
aid. The JAFC sent a telegram of congratulation to Chaim Weizmann, and hundreds
of individual Jews expressed elated solidarity with Israel in phone calls,
personal visits, and letters to the JAFC. In June 1948, with Stalin’s consent,
the Moscow Choral Synagogue organized a ceremonial service of thanks-giving,
attended by several thousand people, and displayed huge posters proclaiming in
Hebrew such patriotic slogans as Am Yisrael Chai. Identical services took place
at the same time in other great cities across the USSR. On September 2, 1948,
Golda Meyerson arrived in Moscow to take up her embassy, and a week later she
attended the Sabbath synagogue service to great public enthusiasm, intensified
when she attended the Rosh ha-Shanah services three weeks later. Nearly twenty
thousand people, for most of whom there was no room inside the synagogue,
participated in this service, which became a fervent communal expression of
gratitude for Israel’s founding, as did the service on Yom Kippur ten days
later, when the concluding prayer of the service, “Next year in Jerusalem,”
coupled with the blowing of the shofar, elicited a powerful emotional response
from the crowd. Jewish sympathy for the State of Israel was so widespread in the
Soviet Union that it brought out of hiding many people who had earlier taken
great pains to conceal their Jewish origins, including the wife of Marshal
Kliment Voroshilov, a former Defense Commissar, and Molotov’s wife Polina
Zhemchuzhina who, at a diplomatic reception in Moscow in November 1948, proudly
declared to Golda Meyerson in Yiddish, “Ikh bin a yidishe tokhter” (I am a
daughter of the Jewish people). Stalin obviously recognized with anger that
foreign policy support for Israel was encouraging Soviet Jews at home to feel
integrally—and impermissibly—part of world Jewry, and he moved brutally to stamp
out all hints of Jewish national consciousness.
The first Yiddish writer arrested in the sharp crackdown against Jews, now
designated “rootless cosmopolites,” that followed was the poet Dovid Hofshteyn,
a lifelong lover of the Hebrew language who not long before had sent a telegram
to Golda Meyerson urging the necessity of reviving the study of Hebrew in the
USSR. On November 20, 1948, two months after Hofshteyn’s arrest, the Politburo
abolished the JAFC with immediate effect, and the very next day the MGB
ransacked its premises and confiscated all its documents. On November 25th the
Yiddish publishing house Der emes was closed down, and by mid-December 1948,
orders were issued for the arrest of Fefer and Benjamin Zuskin, Mikhoels’s
successor as director of GOSET. The MGB patently regarded these two as among
those most vulnerable to psychological pressure, because Zuskin was in an
advanced stage of nervous prostration, and Fefer had for some time been working
as a secret agent for the MGB inside the executive committee of the JAFC. Both
were expected to provide “confessions” that would incriminate others, and the
“evidence” on which to convict them. Fefer was primed to testify about his trip
to America and the “collaboration” with Western intelligence it produced; he was
also pressured to confess to the “nationalistic activity” of the war-time
Yiddish newspaper Eynikeyt and the Jewish section of the Union of Soviet
Writers, in running both of which he had been active. Zuskin was expected to
disclose compromising information about his dead partner Mikhoels, the putative
organizer of subversive Jewish activity in the USSR, and about the Moscow State
Yiddish Theater as the nerve center of anti-Soviet agitation.
On December 24, 1948, Zuskin and Fefer were sent to the Lubyanka, to be followed
there on January 13, 1949 by Boris Shimeliovich, director of Moscow’s Botkin
Hospital, and the trade unionist Joseph Yuzefovich. As a result of forced
confessions extorted from those in prison, those similarly accused were then
arrested between January 24 and 28, 1949: the former deputy commissars Solomon
Lozovsky and Solomon Bregman; the writers Leyb Kvitko, Peretz Markish, and Dovid
Bergelson; the editors Emilia Teumin and Ilya Vatenberg; Vatenberg’s wife Khayke
Vatenberg-Ostrovskaya; and the eminent academician and biochemist, Lina Shtern.
The last of those indicted in this way, the translator and journalist Leon Talmy,
who had lived for more than twelve years in the USA, was arrested six months
later, on July 3, 1949. These arrests were followed by total repression of Jews
in general and Yiddish culture in particular.
With the exception of Fefer, all the defendants were physically beaten and
verbally abused, to enable the interrogators to fabricate confessions to what
Joshua Rubenstein has identified as four separate crimes: (1) bourgeois
nationalism; (2) the creation of an anti-Soviet nationalistic fifth column; (3)
treason against the Soviet Union; and (4) spying for US intelligence. The search
for more incriminating “evidence” and the names of other “bourgeois
nationalists” continued for a further two years, during which the accused were
held incommunicado in the Lubyanka until the interrogators had what they
regarded as enough material to mount a “trial.” In March 1950, the defendants
were informed that the investigation of their case was complete, but they
continued to be held in prison for another eighteen months before the
accusations against them were presented in court. The death penalty, abolished
in 1947, was now reinstated, and other Yiddish literary figures were
progressively arrested and destroyed: the novelist Der Nister (Pinkhas
Kahanovich) perished in a labor camp, the literary critic Yitskhok Nusinov died
in Lefortovo prison, and the journalists Shmuel Persov, Miriam
Aizenshtadt-Zhelezh-nova, and Naum Levin were shot.
By the time the JAFC trial was finally staged in the spring of 1952, some of the
accused had repudiated what they had been forced to “confess” to, so the case
had to be reinvestigated and new confessions forced from them in accordance with
that principle of Soviet law laid down by Vyshinsky, the notorious prosecutor of
the pre-war purge trials, that a confession was irrefutable confirmation of the
guilt of an accused. Since retraction of confessions, all obtained under duress,
left the court theoretically without “evidence,” “experts” were set to work
combing through all the issues of Eynikeyt and other JAFC materials for
corroboration of the state’s indictment. On March 5, 1952, a final list of
fifteen defendants, charged with Zionist and American-inspired plotting against
the Soviet Union, was submitted to the Politburo with the recommendation that
all of them, with the exception of Lina Shtern, be executed. Thus, well before
this “trial” started, the defendants had been condemned to death. The court
process was mere farce, and those in charge of it were obliged to make strenuous
efforts to camouflage the groundlessness of the accusations.
The hearing, held in camera, presided over by three military judges, without
prosecutors, defense counsel, or witnesses, began at noon on May 8th, and
dragged on until July 18, 1952. The principal charge was the “Crimea question”:
whether, during their visit to New York in 1943, Fefer and Mikhoels, in league
with the American JDC, had plotted to establish a Jewish republic in the Crimea
that Zionist and American imperialists could use as a “beachhead” from which to
destroy the Soviet Union. Other defendants were accused of passing state secrets
to the two American “spies,” Goldberg and Novick. Con-trary to what was
expected, however, only Fefer and Teumin fully admitted being “guilty” to the
charges. Lozovsky, Markish, Shimeliovich, and Bregman refused to plead guilty to
anything, and the others pleaded only “guilty in part.” Once they began giving
their own testimony, the defendants were allowed to address the court in great
detail and to cross-examine one another. Al-though in his testimony Lozovsky
repeatedly demonstrated the absurdity of the central charge, the defendants were
forced to admit to other “crimes” newly minted by the state. Markish asserted
that the “very fact” that the JAFC had collected information about Jewish
suffering at Nazi hands was a “nationalist act.” Fefer “admitted” that he was
guilty of “nationalistic chauvinism” because the JAFC had highlighted Jewish
military heroism in the propaganda it distributed to the Western press—a
ludicrous acknowledgment, since this was exactly what the Politburo had
specifically instructed the JAFC to do. Kvitko averred that any attempt to
counter state-enforced assimilation by emphasizing the Jewish cultural heritage
denied the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, and he confirmed that the pro-Israel
demonstrations of 1948 proved the “destructive” and “harmful” effects of the
JAFC on the state. Bergelson confessed that his religious upbringing had
corrupted him, and Talmy seconded Bergelson in asserting that “the Jewish
religion is a crudely nationalistic religion.” All bitterly accused Hofshteyn of
“reactionary” encouragement of the study of Hebrew.
As directed, between the 11th and the 18th of July 1952, the Military Tribunal
sentenced all the defendants except Shtern to death. All the condemned appealed
for clemency to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, categorically denying the
crimes with which they had been charged. Their appeals were denied, and—with the
exception of Bregman, who died before his sentence could be carried out—they
were shot in the Lubyanka on August 12, 1952.
Bitterly enough, their sense of working on borrowed time had been strong in the
condemned writers for over two decades. Fear and disillusionment found
surreptitious, encoded expression in their work, despite all their strenuous
attempts to churn out what was officially demanded. In the early 1940s, for
instance, Markish published a profoundly self-reflective poem that readers in
positions of authority instantly condemned as “pessimistic” and that was later
cited at his trial as damning evidence against his “lack of true Soviet spirit”:
Now, when my vision turns in on itself,
My shocked eyes open, all their members see
My heart has fallen like a mirror on
A stone and shatters, ringing, into splinters.
. . . .
Piece by piece I’ll try to gather them
To make them whole with stabbed and bleeding fingers.
And yet, however skillfully they’re glued,
My crippled, broken image will be seen.4
When Stalin told his people at the height of the Great Purges that “Life has
become better, comrades, life has become gayer,” he was not only reconstructing
their perception of reality, but also issuing a directive to their souls.
Henceforth public expression of even the most private grief would not be
permitted. Small wonder that the haunting cadence of one of Hofshteyn’s poems,
published five years before the Revolution, became with hindsight an ironic
expression of isolation and loss in a world that the Revolution was supposed to
have transformed into a commonwealth of gainful equality:
In silence longing for the fields in the distance,
for the paths and the by-paths wind-blown and snow-covered ...
And concealed in the heart the sorrow of seedlings
that keep waiting, keep waiting their time of sowing ...
Russian fields on winter evenings!
Where can one be more lonely, where can one be more lonely?5
Nearly four years passed between Hofshteyn’s arrest in September 1948 and the
executions in August 1952. Several circumstances, including the hopeless fight
by the defendants, had prolonged, but could not halt, the process or its
purpose. Since the state knew perfectly well that the charges were false, it
would not risk making them publicly known. Even though these ostensibly grave
charges were prosecuted as part of a planned campaign of anti-Jewish repression,
the case against the “Jewish nationalists” was never mentioned in the Soviet
press. Despite their high public profiles, those charged vanished overnight from
public view as though, like thousands of their murdered compatriots, they had
never existed. Questions regarding their whereabouts, never raised in the USSR,
were indeed asked in the West, but were wholly evaded by those from the Soviet
Union, like Ilya Ehrenburg, who might have made an informed guess. Stalin had
trained his Communists well all over the world. Those in the West refused to
believe any evil of Stalin. Not until February 1956, when Khrushchev delivered
his “secret” speech denouncing Stalin’s “cult of personality” at the Twentieth
Party Congress in Moscow, did the truth of the mass murders steadily become
known, even to the families of the victims themselves. When it did, Jews who had
idealistically embraced and dogmatically defended the Bolshevik Revolution and
the murderous despotism it had spawned were constrained to revaluate their
commitment. They would never again be able to read, without incredulous shock,
such contemptuous dismissals of Jewish tradition as, for instance, the one
penned by a young, arrogant Fefer:
I’m a quiet guy and hardly a villain;
My honesty has not great appeal;
I’m never known to put on tfiln,
I’m never known to wheel and deal.
So what if I’ve been circumcised
With rituals, as among the Jews?
Field winds have tanned my middle-sized,
Pale, dreaming feet to darker hues.6
Stalin’s systematic postwar murder of Jews effectively took up where Hitler had
left off. His ferocious assault was mounted against the whole Jewish people, and
all of them suffered. In consequence, the Yiddish language and its culture in
the Soviet Union sustained its most grievous blow. The trial of 1952 did more
than wipe out some of the best Yiddish literary talents of the century; it
completed the destruction of Yiddish in Europe. Always vulnerable to a variety
of life-threatening enemies, Yiddish in the Soviet Union could not survive the
betrayal of the hope the Revolution had awakened for it. Perhaps nothing is more
devastatingly broken than an idealistic heart, nothing more cruelly cut off than
the unfulfilled promise of youth. With terrible irony, the acrid words in which
Leyb Kvitko had years before grieved over the pogroms of the Civil War years now
provided an epitaph for both the poets and their language:
A Russian death
Is death of all deaths.
Russian pain,
Pain of all pains.
Does the world’s wound ooze pus?
How does its heart do now?
Ask any child,
Ask any Jewish child.7
If, as Stalin had decreed, it was a crime to mourn the martyrs of the Holocaust,
a crime to value one’s Jewish heritage, a crime to treasure the language of the
Torah, a crime to be a proud and identifying Jew, to care deeply about continued
Jewish identity and survival in a bloodthirsty world, then those writers
condemned were all, without question, guilty. To lesser or greater degrees,
their creativity, even when exercised under the severest constraints, was
indelibly stamped with the stigmata of their Jewishness. Whatever disavowals may
have been forced from them during the long agony of their imprisonment and
trial, the work they left behind belies them. The Yiddish language in which they
shaped their utterance became the small voice of a betrayed and beaten
Jewishness. Its memory deserves honor; its shapers, our respect.•
Joseph Sherman, a former editor of the South African quarterly journal, Jewish Affairs, is currently Corob Fellow in Yiddish Studies, University of Oxford. Apart from having published a range of scholarly essays in the field of Yiddish literature, he has also translated into English Isaac Bashevis Singer’s novel, Shadows on the Hudson (New York, 1998), and Dovid Bergelson’s novella, Descent (New York, 1999). He is currently writing a book on Dovid Bergelson.