To withdraw from the Gaza Strip has been the most painful decision made by an Israeli government and the most traumatic political event for the country’s people in decades. Indeed, such a voluntary relinquishment of territory captured in an ongoing war is virtually unprecedented in history.
The decision to take this step was made by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon from a belief that it would promote peace. Sharon’s real positions since becoming prime minister in 2001 stand in sharp contrast to the negative stereotype of him that was partly earned during his earlier career.
Most remarkable is the political price he was willing to pay. It is doubtful that one of the main reasons for this decision was the expectation for domestic political gains. Indeed, before he began implementing this step, Sharon had overwhelming popularity, even among many on the left. His Likud party was solidly behind him and it seemed likely that he could continue as prime minister as long as he wanted.
Afterward, his party was split, with a large portion passionately angry at him, and seriously discussing whether to replace him as its leader and candidate for prime minister. Sharon’s political future was thrown, if only temporarily, in doubt.
The main motives for the decision to withdraw included many factors:
—Sharon’s desire to leave a career legacy showing he was a moderate, seeking peace and advancing toward it.
—The belief that there was no chance for a comprehensive diplomatic solution for a long time to come, and thus, Israel needed to establish a transition period in which it chose a sustainable strategic stance.
—The belief of professional army commanders that Israel was best advised to reduce the dispersion of troops by basing its defense mainly on the Gaza Strip-Israel armistice line and a security fence on the West Bank.
—A simple desire to do something rather than simply engage in a long-term war of attrition in which the Palestinians dictated the terms of conflict.
—To put the ball into the Palestinians’ court in international terms by forcing them to show whether they could govern a territory which was for most practical purposes a state, without the excuse of Israeli occupation.
—It was claimed that gains were made regarding U.S. policy including an American commitment to oppose any Palestinian demand that all refugees could return to live in Israel and to support territorial modifications as part of any comprehensive peace agreement.
—For those on the right, the “demographic issue,” which meant ensuring Israel did not rule over Arabs numbering more than Israel’s Jewish population—and thus theoretically endangering democratic norms—was a powerful consideration.
While Arabs believe—or at least publicly state—that the withdrawal was a sign of Israeli weakness, no one in Israel itself takes this argument seriously. Israel had just won the five-year-long terror-based war initiated by the Palestinians in 2000.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ISRAELI THINKING
To understand the political context of this decision, and of Israel’s situation in general, it is necessary to comprehend Israeli thinking about their own goals and the nature of the Arab-Israeli and Israel-Palestinian conflicts.
First, it should be clear that the great majority of Israelis are ready to give up the territories captured in 1967 in exchange for real and lasting peace. Indeed, this has been true for years.
Basically, Israeli politicians and public opinion since 1967 can be divided into three groups:
—Those who have believed that Israel should trade the territories for peace, thinking—at least since the 1980s—that such an exchange could be accomplished relatively quickly. They believed a partner existed, or could be helped into readiness, on the Palestinian side.
—Those who believed that Israel must retain the territories for security purposes for a long period because there was no Arab partner to make peace.
—Those who believed that Israel should keep the territories forever as part of the historical and God-given land of Israel. They were mainly motivated by religious views though in some cases militant nationalist ideology was a factor.
To put it simply, these groups put the priority on, respectively, the goal of peace, that of security, and that of religious piety. Up to 2000, it was easy to characterize these three viewpoints. The first group was on the left, including the Labor Party; the second, most of the Likud; and the third the National Religious Party, the extreme right, and portions of the Likud.
What shook up this debate was the Oslo peace process, which began in 1993 and ended in 2000. During that period, Israel tried the first option. It made gigantic concessions and took real risks. It accepted the creation of a Palestinian state and a departure from most of the territories captured in the 1967 war in principle, recognized the PLO, let its forces—including many terrorists—return, and gave it guns and control over territory.
That step was taken on the basis of two promises. First, the PLO said it would recognize Israel, cease incitement to destroy Israel, stop its own terrorism, and dismantle groups trying to attack Israel. Over the next seven years, few of these commitments were kept. And when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered to agree to an independent Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem in 2000, the PLO leadership responded with rejection and a new five-year-long terrorist war in which over 1,000 Israelis were killed, many of them by weapons Israel had given, or let the Palestinians have, supposedly to stop terrorism.
The second broken promise was that made by the world. Israel was told that if it took risks and made concessions for peace, the world would recognize these good intentions and support it politically. Yet in the aftermath of the Oslo process, and despite Israel’s efforts and casualties from terrorism, what followed was the largest outpouring of slander and hatred against Israel in the country’s history.
As a result of these experiences, the overwhelming majority of Israelis were doubtful about the likelihood that the existing Palestinian movement would be a real partner for peace. Many things in the last five years have only reinforced that viewpoint.
But while the Oslo experience subverted the left’s argument, it actually proved that everyone was wrong. The debate can be put simply like this:
The left argued that the Palestinian leadership would make a comprehensive peace deal which gave them an independent state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem. In exchange it would recognize Israel, stop terrorism and incitement, give up the claim that all Palestinians could go and live in Israel, and declare an end to the conflict. The left claimed that Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians would not only make but also keep to this deal.
The right argued that the Palestinian leadership would sign some agreement that gave it control over that territory and then break the deal, using their new state as a base for continuing the conflict and trying to destroy Israel.
No one argued that Arafat would be offered the bargain that the left proposed, reject it, and instead return to all-out war.
What emerged from this shock for everyone was a new synthesis in Israeli thinking. The great majority of both left and right now accepted the left’s idea that they were ready in principle to offer the Palestinians a comprehensive peace including an independent state including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem. But at the same time, the great majority of both left and right now accepted the right’s idea that there was not going to be a peace partner on the Palestinian side for a long time to come.
Withdrawing from the Gaza Strip, and a portion of the West Bank, was thus an attractive bridging concept for about 70 percent of the population. Among other points, it showed Israel wanted peace while ridding it of some territory that no one really wanted. The step did not require believing that there existed a well-intentioned or capable Palestinian partner, nor did it compromise other, more controversial, issues. A sustainable and improved security position was created.
Even the protests and demonstrations against withdrawal were largely motivated by the opponents’ fear that this was a precedent for withdrawal from the West Bank, rather than any affection for keeping the Gaza Strip.
HOPES, DOUBTS, AND AMBIGUITY
And yet, despite the points made above, there was considerable ambiguity, doubt, and sadness even among the advocates of a withdrawal. Forcibly removing Jews from the Gaza Strip and wrecking homes and facilities—as the Palestinian leadership preferred their destruction to taking them over—was emotionally difficult. Everyone knew that the main Palestinian reaction would be to claim this as a victory for terrorism and an incentive for more attacks. There was widespread cynicism that the international response would be a short period of congratulation followed by a demand for more unilateral concessions.
Still, there was also a mood of satisfaction that the country had gotten through this trauma without a greater challenge to national unity. There was also pride that the operation had been carried out in a well-organized manner.
The question now is what will be the outcome and to what extent will Israelis, in the months and years to come, judge this step to be a success or failure.
Israel hopes its disengagement from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank will be a successful step toward achieving a more stable, less violent situation and ultimately a comprehensive peace agreement. Indeed, Israel sees this goal as so important that it is ready to take big risks, make major concessions, and even face a national trauma in pursuing it.
Yet the withdrawal itself is only phase one of what could be a new era of progress toward peace. The moment Israel’s presence is removed, the focus shifts to what the Palestinians are willing and able to do.
Objectively, both sides have a common interest in ending the fighting, improving their peoples’ security and living standards, and ultimately creating two states for two peoples living peacefully side by side. By its actions, Israel shows it understands the benefits of cooperation. Soon both Israel and the international community must judge whether the Palestinians have taken advantage of this opportunity, and act accordingly.
Reaching a democratic decision, overwhelmingly supported by national public opinion, to implement this disengagement has been very difficult for Israel. It required rethinking hitherto accepted security concepts. Could Israel redeploy without seeming to signal this was a victory for terrorism? Was the country ready to uproot citizens who had lived in Gaza for decades and built productive lives there? Did redeployment mean giving up an asset in the negotiating process without any commitment from the other side?
In the aftermath of the actual redeployment, there are four critical factors which must be energetically pursued and carefully assessed: security, development, diplomacy, and international assistance.
Regarding security, there is an intimate connection between the needs of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. Neither side benefits from continued violence, an idea accepted by the former but not among all of the latter.
If the Palestinians now fulfill their commitments under the Road Map and previous agreements to stop terror attacks on Israel, there will be a peaceful situation. If, however, attacks continue—on the ground or by missile and mortar firings at Israeli civilian targets—Israel will take the necessary steps to defend its populace. Israel recognizes that the Palestinian authorities will not always succeed in blocking attacks, but it rightly demands that they make every effort to do so.
As for development, Israel recognizes its interest in the maximum prosperity and best possible living standards for Palestinians as well as its own citizens. It is vital to show that people are better off under conditions of peace and progress rather than that of following the paths of violence and extremism. Israel has long shown its commitment by supplying and facilitating aid for the well-being of the Palestinians.
Aid, however, must be applied for peaceful pursuits. Large-scale corruption and spending money to subsidize terrorists and buy weapons detracts from this effort. How aid money is used will be another test of Palestinian intentions and policy.
The redeployment is also intended to facilitate the diplomatic process, in the framework of the Road Map to Peace. A key element of this agreement is the Palestinian commitment to end terrorism, including the disarming and dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure and ending the incitement that encourages violence.
Now, without an Israeli presence on the ground, Palestinians will have full responsibility for developments in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority has the chance to demonstrate its ability (or inability) to govern and fulfill its commitments. If it fulfills its promises, rapid progress and a bright future for all the people of the area is ensured. Otherwise, it will be responsible for the continuation of violence, stagnation, and crisis. Israel very much hopes that the Palestinian leadership will successfully meet this test.
Finally, there is a vital role for the international community. It can provide assistance to ensure that disengagement is a success. Yet to be productive, such involvement must empower moderates and weaken extremists. The ultimate goals of such help must always be kept in mind.
Israel also hopes its neighbors in the region will seize this opportunity to re-engage with it, to build together a region of peace, stability, and cooperation. The second peace process, between the Arab states and Israel, is as vital as the Israel-Palestinian track, both in its own right and to promote the success of that effort.
The disengagement policy of Israel is a show of faith and desire for peace. With reciprocation from the other side and help from the international community, it can be a breakthrough toward meeting the needs of all the peoples involved and fulfilling the dream of harmony instead of strife in the region.
UNPLEASANT REALITIES
These are hopes which might be well incorporated into policy and explanation, yet should not blind us from making an accurate analysis of what is actually happening on the ground. The situation within the Gaza Strip is and is likely to remain one in which the Palestinian Authority (PA) will do little or nothing to set up any real governing authority. There will be constant intra-Palestinian fighting though no civil war. Perhaps Gaza will be divided in practice into different zones under the control of Hamas, a hard-line Fatah militia, various PA rival security agencies that operate independently, or the forces of Muhammad Dahlan that support the PA’s official leader, Marwan Abbas.
Among the results could well be:
—Sporadic fighting on the Gaza-Israel border with relatively low damage and casualties for Israel.
—The firing into Israel of missiles and mortars with no effective deterrence beforehand or punishment for perpetrators by the PA. Israel will then have to send forces into the Gaza Strip periodically to destroy such weapons and strike against those shooting them.
—The possibility that Egyptian forces being deployed along that country’s border with the Gaza Strip will be ineffective or indifferent to stopping arms smuggling. But will the arms flowing into the Gaza Strip be used against Israel or more often in the competition among Palestinian groups there?
—An attempted Palestinian upsurge in West Bank terrorist efforts inspired by a Gaza “victory” and the argument that a few more months of violence will force a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from that area. The security fence will largely block attacks into Israel, but West Bank settlements, roads, and those guarding them will face increased danger. The answer to this argument, however, is that terrorist forces in the West Bank are already doing as much attacking as they can and would continue to do so no matter what happened in the Gaza Strip.
Ironically, and indeed against all logic—because of their own leadership and strategy—there is a strong likelihood that the Palestinians will lose more from the withdrawal than will Israel. After all, five or ten more years of terrorism will not force an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank or east Jerusalem. But it will paralyze Palestinian development, erode international support, and demoralize the Palestinians. Israel will retaliate as needed, sending forces into Gaza in response to missile and mortar firings. With the security fence, Israel will improve its ability to stop attacks onto its own territory. While Palestinian terrorist groups will try to increase the intensity of attacks on the West Bank, the truth is, as mentioned above, that they are already doing pretty much everything they can.
If these factors were all the Palestinians’ post-withdrawal problems the situation could be managed using the same techniques the leaders have always employed: glorify revolution, make violence, blame Israel, seek foreign sympathy, steal aid money, and ignore the people’s material problems. (That last sentence seems rather harsh but is quite accurate.) Yet having the Gaza Strip adds a new ingredient. As the saying goes, be careful what you wish for because you might get it.
It is astonishing how thoroughly people forget that the Palestinians have run the Gaza Strip for the last 11 years. True, they did not have all the roads or land, and Israel could intervene in various ways, yet they had about 80 percent control. In that context, the Palestinian Authority was corrupt, incompetent, and deliberately weak without undermining its legitimacy too much.
Now, however, begins a new level of struggle within the movement, likely to send anarchy to record heights and make Gazans’ lives harder. Despite a facade of having a common goal and a common enemy, this new situation is likely to push the movement toward what amounts to disintegration. Yet the fact remains that the withdrawal offers the Palestinians an opportunity which only they can exploit.
In light of such realities, the world should make fair judgments regarding these events. It should watch the Palestinian leadership to see if it does try to create a stable, peaceful situation in the Gaza Strip. Will it put the emphasis on development or warfare? Will the calls to destroy Israel in the official Palestinian media cease? Will there be a serious effort for compromise or merely more unilateral demands backed up by terrorist violence?
If, as seems almost inevitable, the response is undiminished hostility and militancy, the world must conclude that Israel has done what it can for peace while the other side has not. Only if the response—in terms of deeds and not just words—is encouraging will Israel be willing to make further compromises and take more risks in the future.
Equally, the international community should understand the difficult and risky effort which Israel has undertaken. It needs to comprehend what this process—carried out democratically—tells about Israel, belying the viciously negative stereotypes about that country, which has so many parallels to past hatreds of the Jews. • About the author
Professor Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the Interdisciplinary University in Herzliya, Israel, and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His recent books include The Tragedy of the Middle East (Cambridge University Press), Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography (Oxford University Press; co-authored), and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (John Wiley Publishers).